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JUST THE MEDICAL FACTS: AN
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE
CONTINUED BAN ON PHYSICIAN-
ASSISTED SUICIDE
JAMES J. BoPP, JR.*
Thank you very much; it is a pleasure to be here. Assisted
suicide is a complex topic, as the first speaker has certainly
demonstrated in his survey of opinions in ethics, morality and
the law. 1 Assisted suicide is an intersection not only of those
concepts, but also of medicine, 2 compassion, 3 and society's atti-
* J.D., 1973, University of Florida, College of Law. Mr. Bopp is an attorney and
scholar who has argued constitutional issues in numerous civil rights cases dealing with
abortion, infanticide, euthanasia, and assisted suicide. Mr. Bopp has taught law at Indi-
ana University and served as Deputy Attorney General for Indiana.
Mr. Bopp is the founder, and has served as President since 1984, of the National Legal
Center for the Medically Dependent and Disabled. He has testified before over 25 legis-
lative committees, and in over 15 federal congressional and administrative hearings. He
has edited two books, Restoring the Right to Life: The Human Life Amendment (1984),
and Human Life and Health Care Ethics (1985). He has authored over 40 law review ar-
ticles and has filed over two dozen briefs on constitutional issues in the United States
Supreme Court. Mr. Bopp is also Editor-in-Chief of Issues in Law & Medicine, a quarterly
law journal addressing medical and legal issues.
In 1987, Congress appointed Mr. Bopp to the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee,
which advises Congress on ethical issues arising from the delivery of healthcare, and
biomedical and behavioral research. From 1984 to 1987, Mr. Bopp served on the Presi-
dent's Committee on Mental Retardation, which advises the federal government on ap-
propriate public policies to protect people with disabilities from discrimination, and to
gain full access to American society. In addition, he has served as General Counsel for
the National Right to Life Committee since 1978.
1 See Mon. John A. Alesandro, Esq., Is There a Constitutional 'Right to Die?, 12 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 634 (1997) (presenting discussion of physician-assisted sui-
cide during panel discussion at St. John's University School of Law on April 4, 1997).
2 See James J. Bopp, Jr., Preface, 12 ISSUES L. & MED. iii, iii (1996) (surveying vari-
ous concepts linked to physician-assisted suicide); Brief of the Attorney General in
Washington v. Glucksberg in the United States Supreme Court, 12 ISSUES L. & MED. 295,
315 (1996) (comparing ideal medical treatment to reality of existing medical practices);
Charles J. Dougherty, The Common Good, Terminal Illness, and Euthanasia, 9 ISSUES L.
& MED. 151, 164-65 (1993) (discussing issues of professional ethics facing physicians
when confronted with legalization of physician-assisted suicide).
3 See Dougherty, supra note 2, at 151-52 (discussing changing face of death and its
impact on dying individuals attitudes); George P. Smith, All's Well That Ends Well: To-
ward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 307-08 (1989) (addressing problem of dying with compassion and
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tude toward the terminally ill and the disabled. 4
As the law develops, particularly as it is developed by the
courts, its development usually begins with the facts. 5 That is, a
properly decided court decision is inseparable from human expe-
rience. It is based upon the reality of the circumstances that the
court is addressing and should, therefore, reflect that human
reality. Unfortunately, it seems that the debate on physician-
assisted suicide is full of false premises and misunderstandings
about the process of dying and what may cause people to seek
suicide.
I too, have been deeply involved in the issue of physician-
assisted suicide. In 1982, I founded the Hospice of the Wabash
Valley, which now serves patients in five counties in the loca-
tions surrounding where I live. I also served as chairman of the
board for eight years. As you know, Hospice provides palliative
care to people who are terminally ill and dying.
6
Furthermore, in 1994, I represented and continue to represent
terminally ill patients, physicians and nursing homes in the
State of Oregon who have obtained a declaratory judgment that
Oregon Measure 16, which would have legalized assisted suicide
in Oregon, 7 was unconstitutional. 8 The statute deprived people
dignity that incurably disabled people face).
4 See Paul K. Longmore & Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice, 3
ISSUES L. & MED. 141, 167-68 (1987) (discussing prejudicial assumptions of society with
regard to disabled people); Leslie L. Mangini, To Help or Not to Help: Assisted Suicide
and its Moral, Ethical, and Legal Ramifications, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 728, 734-36
(1994) (outlining American common law view of suicide); Smith, supra note 3, at 290-92
(discussing evolution of societal attitudes toward suicide in America).
5 See generally WILLIAM E. WEGNER, CLOSING ARGUMENT § 13:1 (1993-96) (noting
that suggestion of critical facts essential to persuading jury); Pamela Samuelson, Good
Legal Writing: Of Orwell and Window Panes, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 149, 166-67 (1984)
(suggesting that beginning with discussion of facts aids in effective legal argument).
6 See Warren L. Wheeler, Hospice Philosophy: An Alternative to Assisted Suicide, 20
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 755, 755 (1994) (defining hospice care as medically oriented team ap-
proach to managing pain of individuals with short life expectancy).
7 See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1997) (dismissing challenge to
Oregon's Measure 16 on grounds that plaintiffs did not have standing), cert. filed, 65
U.S.L.W. 3783 (1997); see also Thomas Maier, Death By Choice: Oregon Voters Back MD-
Aided Suicides, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6, 1997, at A5 (reporting that voters in Oregon approved
law allowing prescription of life-ending drugs to terminally ill patients); Jeff Mapes, Sui-
cide Law Ruling May Shake up Fall Vote, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 16, 1997, at Al
(describing opinion of James Bopp as chief attorney for Measure 16 Opponents regarding
appeal to Supreme Court); Mark O'Keefe et al., Legislators May Refer Suicide Law to
Voters, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 1, 1997, Dl (discussing Bopp's plan to appeal to Su-
preme Court if Ninth Circuit refused to reconsider decision); Mark O'Keefe, Measure 16
Foes Keep Using Courts to Stall Law, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 16, 1997, at Bll
(discussing Bopp's reaction to Ninth Circuit's denial of reconsideration of February rul-
ing).
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with terminal illnesses of the protection of Oregon law against
assisted suicide. 9 Furthermore, as president of the National Le-
gal Center for the Medically Dependent & Disabled, 10 I helped
coordinate, as our organization was the national coordinator, the
amicus curiae briefs filed in support of the anti-assisted suicide
laws in New York and Washington. 11
There were forty-one amicus curiae briefs filed in support of
the New York and Washington laws. 12 It really was an incredible
array from a broad range of groups. There was a near unani-
mous opinion of the professional organizations representing
people who minister to people who are terminally ill each and
every day. These included the American Medical Association,
the American Hospital Association, 13 the American Nurses As-
sociation, 14 the National Hospice Organization, 15 the American
8 See Lee, 107 F.3d at 1386 (discussing plaintiffs' claims that Oregon's Measure 16
was unconstitutional, as violation of equal protection and due process rights under Four-
teenth Amendment; free exercise of religion and freedom of association rights under
First Amendment, and; statutory rights under Americans with Disabilities Act); see
James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The Constitutional Case Against Permitting Phy-
sician-Assisted Suicide for Competent Adults with "Terminal Conditions" 11 ISSUES L. &
MED. 239, 254-67 (1995) (discussing why Measure 16 is unconstitutional).
9 See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1995) (legalizing physician-assisted suicide).
10 See Frank J. Murray, Assisted Suicide Goes to Top Court Justices Will Decide if
Practice is a Right, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, at Al (quoting Bopp as stating Constitu-
tion not meant to protect doctors who play executioner); Judy Wiessler, Right to
Die/High Court to Rule On Assisted Suicide, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 2, 1996, at 1 (noting
that Bopp, President of National Legal Center for Medically Dependent and Disabled,
stated thirty-five states prohibit physician-assisted suicide, in response to Supreme
Court's decision to review issue).
11 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1997) (stating that one who intentionally
causes or aids another to commit suicide is liable for manslaughter in second degree);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1997) (classifying promotion of suicide as Class C felony).
12 See generally Richard E. Coleson, The Glucksberg & Quill Amicus Curiae Briefs:
Verbatim Arguments Opposing Assisted Suicide, 13 ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (1997)
[hereinafter Coleson, Verbatim Arguments].
13 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Hosp. Ass'n in Support of the Petitioners
at 3-4, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997) (Nos. 96-110, 95-1858), available in 1996 WL 656278 [hereinafter AHA Brief]
(contending that association supports right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, but not
right to choose physician-assisted suicide).
14 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Med. Ass'n, et al. in Support of the Peti-
tioners at 2-3, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110), available
in 1996 WL 656263 [hereinafter AMA Brief] (arguing physician-assisted suicide is not
solution for inadequate healthcare, American Nurses Association joined submission of
Brief to Supreme Court).
15 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Hospice Org. in Support of the Petitioners
at 4-5, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), available in 1996 WL 656338 [hereinafter Hospice Brief]
(arguing that lower courts failed to appreciate that end of life is full of meaningful expe-
riences).
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Geriatric Society 16 and many, many others. The sole exception
from the unanimous view of the healthcare organizations was
the National Student Medical Association, which filed a brief for
the opposing side. 17 I think that proves the old adage: Students
know only enough to be dangerous.
In addition to the healthcare professions, there were organi-
zations representing people with disabilities,18 the United States
Catholic Conference, 19 the National Right to Life Committee 20
and the Clinton Administration 21 that all supported the notion
that laws against assisted suicide should be upheld by the Su-
preme Court.
Many of the briefs were what we term "Brandeis briefs. ' 22 The
term was made famous by a then-lawyer, Louis Brandeis, who
became a distinguished Justice of the United States Supreme
Court. 23 He was purported to have filed the first brief that
16 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Geriatrics Soc'y in Support of the Peti-
tioners at 3-4, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858), available in 1996 WL
656290 [hereinafter Geriatrics Brief] (noting that Second and Ninth Circuits did not ade-
quately consider medical realities surrounding death).
17 See American Med. Student Association and a Coalition of Distinguished Medical
Professionals in Support of Respondents at 2-3, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997),
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110) (arguing there
is no clinical basis to distinguish between patients refusing life-sustaining treatment and
those seeking physician-assisted suicide).
18 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent
& Disabled, Inc., et al. in Support of the Petitioners, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997), Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), avail-
able in 1996 WL 656336; Brief Amicus Curiae of Not Dead Yet and American Disabled
for Attendant Programs Today in Support of Petitioners, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997) (No. 95-1858), available in 1996 WL 707992.
19 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic Conference, et al. in Sup-
port of Petitioners at 3-5, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 98-1858), available in
1996 WL 656248 (arguing it is grave injustice to deprive persons of protection of homicide
laws based on condition of health).
20 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Right to Life Comm. in Support of Peti-
tioners at 1-2, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110), available
in 1996 WL 656315 (finding that right to suicide has not been properly formulated in his-
tory and tradition of nation).
21 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Vacco v.
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110).
22 See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 188 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "Brandeis
brief' as "[florm of appellate brief in which economic and social surveys and studies are
included along with legal principles and citations which takes its name from Louis D.
Brandeis, former Associate Justice of Supreme Court").
23 See Sanford Levinson, Fan Letters: Holmes & Frankfurter: Their Correspondence,
1912-1934, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1471, 1483 (1997) (discussing Brandeis as inventor of
"Brandeis brief' who was extremely fact-oriented, as evidenced by his opinions while Su-
preme Court Justice). See generally BLACK'S, supra note 22, at 188 (noting "Brandeis
brief' takes its name from Louis D. Brandeis, former Associate Justice of Supreme Court,
who used this tactic while practicing law).
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sought to advise a court of the societal consequences of a poten-
tial ruling by setting forth extensive relevant facts, outside the
record that the court has before it, to inform and assist judges in
coming to a correct result.24 Such briefs often play a major role
in the decisions that courts make.25
You will hear, and have heard, from many lawyers about the
law. I have chosen this morning not to focus on the law, but on
the medical facts about suicide, as set forth in the amicus curiae
briefs filed with the Supreme Court. 26 Many of the excerpts from
these briefs will be published in a forthcoming edition of a jour-
nal about law and medicine which I edit. In this talk, I will try to
consolidate what I think are the principal medical facts that
these briefs point out, and that provide the basis for an informed
discussion of how the law should deal with this important issue.
The first medical fact: Using modern medical techniques, pain
can be successfully controlled. 27 According to the brief of the
American Medical Association, the Second Circuit's decision 28
rested in substantial part on the assumption that there is a
growing number of terminally ill patients who die protracted and
painful deaths,29 that absent physician-assisted suicide, these
24 See generally Imad D. Abyad, Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn's Uni-
form Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429, 450 (1997) (stating that
"Brandeis briefs" may be received through testimony of expert witnesses); G. Edward
White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15
LAw & HIST. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (noting that "Brandeis brief' designed to incorporate argu-
ments that legal rules should reflect social context into decisions).
25 See BLACK'S, supra note 22, at 82 (noting such briefs often are submitted at re-
quest of courts).
26 See, e.g., AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 2-3, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 (1997) (No. 96-110) (arguing physician-assisted suicide is not solution for inade-
quate healthcare); AHA Brief, supra note 13, at 3-4, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997), Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (Nos. 96-110, 95-1858) (contending
that association supports right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, but not right to choose
physician-assisted suicide); Geriatrics Brief, supra note 16, at 3-4, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.
Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) (noting that Second and Ninth Circuits did not adequately
consider medical realities surrounding death).
27 See, e.g., Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon, Physician-Assisted Suicide:
The Lethal Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions, 85 CAL. L. REV. 371, 399-
400 (1997) (noting that since pain and suffering frequently can be controlled in majority
of cases, it is only sense that patient has lost control that causes him or her to want to
end life).
28 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 718 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that physicians may
prescribe drugs for mentally competent patients to self-administer if they seek to end
their lives during final stages of terminal illness), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
29 See AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 5-6, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) (finding that it was implicit in Second Circuit's decision that those
requesting suicide do so to avoid excruciating pain); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra
note 12, at 9.
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patients are condemned to face unmitigated torture before they
die. 30 "Implicit in the [court's] holding [are] the view[s] that
[many of] those who request suicide do so to avoid excruciating
pain and that health care professionals can do nothing compas-
sionate in response other than" to assist in suicide. 31
The Court cites no evidence, says the American Medical Asso-
ciation, to support these views. 32 In fact, available information
demonstrates that these views are mistaken. 33
There is no evidence that increasing numbers of patients are
dying in severe pain. To the contrary, "[t]he potential for
management of pain has recently improved both through the
development of better techniques and through enhanced
care delivery through hospice and palliative care ef-
forts."34 ... The pain of most terminally ill patients can be
controlled through[out] the dying process without heavy se-
dation or anesthesia ... Given the increasing ability to con-
trol pain, it is not surprising that, [contrary to the Second
Circuit's assumption,] the demand for physician-assisted
suicide does not come principally from those seeking relief
from physical pain. A recent study of such requests in
Washington State found that.., severe pain.., was [not] a
common patient concern, suggesting that intolerable physi-
cal symptoms are not the reason most patients request phy-
sician-assisted suicide or euthanasia.35
Second medical fact: Suicidal requests result from depres-
sion.36 "Depression is the single factor found to be a significant
30 See AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 5-6, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) (discussing fallacy that physicians' only compassionate response to
extreme pain is suicide); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 9.
31 AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 5-6, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) (addressing issue of physicians' response to severe pain); Coleson,
Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 9.
32 See AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 6, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110)(arguing that there is no evidence supporting view that increasing
numbers of patients die in severe pain); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at
9.
33 See AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 6, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) (noting that management of pain has improved with better tech-
niques and advanced technology).
34 Id. (discussing development of improved pain management) (quoting AMA Council
on Scientific Affairs, Good Care of the Dying Patient, 275 JAMA 474, 475 (1996)).
35 AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 6, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)
(No. 96-110) (discussing reasons why patients commonly seek to commit suicide); Cole-
son, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 9-10.
36 See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 8, at 242 (stating that most people seeking suicide
suffer from depressive illness, or some other psychiatric or emotional problem); Herbert
1997]
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predictor of the desire for death."37 What are we talking about
when we talk about depression? We are not talking about the
term as we commonly use it; that is, being in a sad mood. What
we are talking about is the psychiatric illness of depression,
which triggers suicidal wishes. It is a psychiatric illness that
renders one incapable of rational decision making. 38 It is often
triggered by major negative life events, such as a divorce, death,
loss of a job, loss of a family member, or the onset of a terminal
illness. 3 9
Depression arising from such causes is, to a large extent,
treatable with both therapy and drugs.40 Depression can be di-
agnosed by a series of symptoms: Sleep disturbance; interest
loss; feelings of guilt or worthlessness; energy decrease; concen-
tration loss; appetite change; psycho-motor changes; and suicidal
ideation.41 Generally, these are symptoms relating to a depres-
Hendin, Suicide and the Request for Assisted Suicide: Meaning and Motivation, 35 DUQ.
L. REV. 285, 285 (1996) (noting close to ninety-five percent of individuals who seek sui-
cide have diagnosable psychiatric illness); Susan M. Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide in
the Context of Managed Care, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 455, 466 (1996) (finding that most patients
who seriously prepare for euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide are depressed).
37 AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 9, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)
(No. 96-110) (noting that anxieties during serious illnesses are complicated by depres-
sion); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 11.
38 See Ruth Macklin, Some Problems in Gaining Informed Consent from Psychiatric
Patients, 31 EMORY L.J. 345, 365 (1982) (noting that patients suffering from depression
are unable to make rational decisions about treatment); G. Steven Neeley, Chaos in the
"Laboratory' of the States": The Mounting Urgency in the Call for Judicial Recognition of
a Constitutional Right to Self-Directed Death, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 81, 89 (1994)
(discussing case where physician would not honor suicide request because patient was
depressed, therefore irrational).
39 See, e.g., Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity,
and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 225 (1994) (noting that sexual
victimization puts women at higher risk for clinical depression); Debbie S. Holmes, Mari-
tal Privileges in the Criminal Context: The Need for a Victim Spouse Exception in Texas
Rule of Criminal Evidence, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 1095, 1117 (1991) (finding that natural dis-
asters and personal disasters, such as assault and rape, trigger post-traumatic stress
disorder, or depression).
40 See Stanley S. Herr et al., No Place to Go: Refusal of Life-Sustaining Treatment by
Competent Persons with Physical Disabilities, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 22 (1992) (reporting
that patients who are depressed may be treated if accurately and promptly diagnosed);
Nancy J. Osgood, Ph.D., Assisted Suicide and Older People-A Deadly Combination:
Ethical Problems in Permitting Assisted Suicide, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 415, 427 (1995)
(noting that depression is treatable by antidepressant drugs, electroconvulsive therapy,
support groups and psychological therapies); Ronald L. Wisor, Community Care, Compe-
tition and Coercion: A Legal Perspective on Privatized Mental Health Care, 19 AM. J.L. &
MED. 145, 167 (1993) (explaining that depression and schizophrenia can both be success-
fully treated with medication and therapy).
41 See generally Amiram Elwork, Depression's Devastation: Occupational Stress Can
Contribute to Depression, 56-May OR. ST. B. BULL. 39, 39 (1996) (noting symptoms of de-
pression include sadness, fear of rejection and failure, guilt and anger); Elizabeth
Emmett, Depression: Research Sheds Light On a Dark Illness, 31-Fall ARK. LAW. 4, 4
JUST THE MEDICAL FACTS
sive mood. One survey indicates that ninety-five percent of those
who attempt suicide have the psychiatric illness of depression. 42
The American Medical Association went further in discussing
this issue. 43 "In this regard, those with terminal or chronic ill-
ness are no different than others who express suicidal wishes.
Most who commit suicide suffer from depression or some other
diagnosable psychiatric illness, which generally is treatable. '44
Thus, it is because of the depression, not particularly the termi-
nal illness, that suicidal attempts occur. One survey, reported in
one of the briefs, 45 said that of all attempted suicides in the
United States, only two to four percent involve people who ac-
tually are terminally ill.46 This suggests, once again, that any
life event can trigger episodes of suicidal tendencies. The Ameri-
can Medical Association concluded that:
While severe chronic or terminal illness is a risk factor for
suicide, 'only a small percentage of terminally ill or severely
ill patients attempt or commit suicide'... [These] patients
are similar to physically healthy individuals who contem-
plate suicide they 'are usually suffering from a treatable
mental illness, most commonly depression.' 47
The American Suicide Foundation argued in its brief:
No sound scientific or clinical basis exists for distinguishing
(1996) (stating that those suffering from depression live in world of gray, feeling hope-
less, numb or suicidal); David R. Price & Paul R. Leeshaley, Ph.D., Defending Claim of
Postconcussion Syndrome, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 589, 593 (1995) (noting that depression is
both symptom of other illnesses and illness in and of itself).
42 Hendin, supra note 36, at 285 (noting close to ninety-five percent of suicide victims
had diagnosable psychiatric illness in months before death); see also Abstracts, 12 ISSUES
L. & MED. 325, 327-28 (1996) (noting that ninety-five percent of suicide victims are suf-
fering from psychiatric illness, and most suffer from depression).
43 See Brief of American Med. Ass'n at 8-10 (discussing why most patients commit
suicide); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 11-12.
44 Id. at 9 (addressing root of suicidal tendencies in patients with terminal illnesses);
Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 11.
45 See id. at 10 (discussing connection between terminal illness and suicide); Coleson,
Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 12.
46 See Edward J. Larson, Prescription for Death: A Second Opinion, 44 DEPAUL L.
REV. 461, 468-69 (1995) (discussing major studies that agree that only two to four percent
of suicide victims are struggling with terminal illness) (citing David C. Clark, "Rational"
Suicide and People with Terminal Conditions or Disabilities, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 151
(1992)); Osgood, supra note 40, at 427 (noting percentage of suicide victims with terminal
illness is only two to four percent).
47 AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 10, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)
(No. 96-11D)(discussing link between terminal illness and suicide) (quoting New York
Task Force, When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Con-
text, 271 JAMA 1786, 9, 13 (1994)).
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suicidal patients with terminal conditions from other suici-
dal patients; treatable, reversible mental disorders, usually
of a depressive nature, characterize both. Both groups are
ambivalent about the desire to die; both suffer from extreme
anxiety and cognitive impairments; both have excessive
needs for control, most dramatically expressed by controlling
the time and place of their death. In both groups depression
interferes with their decision-making ability.48
Medical fact number four: In elderly and ill patients it is diffi-
cult to determine if a patient is competent or depressed. 49 The
American Geriatric Society addressed this issue:50
The seriously ill commonly have deficits in cognitive and
emotional functioning[,] which change over relatively short
periods of time and correlate strongly with suicide inquiries.
Many elderly patients and dying cancer patients experience
delirium, a syndrome in which they are confused, unable to
maintain attention, and unable to master new information.
Most episodes are not detected in usual care. Likewise, de-
pression is common, serious, and often undetected and un-
treated. Depression, delirium, and mood disorders strongly
correlate with [risk of] suicide. Indeed, most cancer patients
now committing suicide have discernible psychiatric ill-
ness... [that] strongly corresponds with risk of suicide.
Treatment of depression substantially alters an initial incli-
nation to refuse life-sustaining treatment .... Excluding
[depressed] patients from access to [physician-assisted sui-
cide] would be essential, but that turns out to be quite diffi-
48 Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Suicide Foundation at 3, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110), available in 1996 WL 665436 (arguing
that distinction between patients refusing life-sustaining treatment and choosing physi-
cian-assisted suicide is not supported by evidence); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra
note 12, at 13.
49 See generally Robert A. Burt, Constitutionalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide: Will
Lightning Strike Thrice?, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 159, 174 (1996) (noting that distinguishing be-
tween profound sadness and clinical depression is difficult); Edward R. Grant & Paul B.
Linton, Relief or Reproach?: Euthanasia Rights in the Wake of Measure 16, 74 OR. L.
REV. 449, 531-32 (1995) (addressing problem of characterizing patients as clinically de-
pressed); Danuta Mendelson, Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts
of Consent to, and Refusal of, Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL
MED. 1, 48-49 (noting that law presumes every adult is competent to make medical deci-
sions until proven otherwise); Thomas F. Schindler, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia:
Ethical Dimensions of the Public Debate, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 719, 720 (1995)
(discussing various problems with drawing lines in determining who should be given
right to physician-assisted suicide).
50 Geriatrics Brief, supra note 16, at 22-23, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No.
95-1858) (discussing problems with determining whether patients with terminal illness
are competent); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 62-64.
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cult. Most depression, just like most delirium, is not recog-
nized or treated in current practice. The risks of involving
persons with diminished capacity in [physician-assisted
suicide] are substantial. 51
Medical fact number five: Elderly and ill patients are subject
to undue influence and coercion and many will not seek assisted
suicide voluntarily.52 The American Geriatric Society also ad-
dressed this issue:53
Proponents of a constitutional right to [physician-assisted
suicide] expect the practice to be limited to persons who are
acting voluntarily, without undue influence or coercion. The
image is that of an independent, capable person thoughtfully
evaluating his or her options, unaffected by biased third
parties or other circumstances. This is so far from the ex-
perience of dying as to be fanciful. Dying persons are often
very weak, prone to strong emotions, and vulnerable to the
suggestions, expectations, and guidance of others. In this
context, pressure or encouragement from family, friends,
and caregivers may cloud or overwhelm the patient's inde-
pendent judgment and thus amount to inappropriate coer-
cion. 54
Medical fact number six: Pressure to contain healthcare costs
will cause people to seek suicide. 55 The American Medical Asso-
51 Geriatrics Brief, supra note 16, at 22-23, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No.
95-1858) (addressing issue of competence as it relates to patients with terminal illness
seeking physician-assisted suicide); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 63-
64.
52 See Larson, supra note 46, at 473-74 (noting that states raised interest in prevent-
ing undue influence in defense of statutes prohibiting physician-assisted suicide); Ed-
ward J. Larson, Seeking Compassion in Dying: The Washington State Law Against As-
sisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 509, 514-15 (1995) (noting that ageism could lead
physicians to accept that elderly patients have desire to commit suicide without sufficient
investigation of motives). See generally Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Contracts to Devise or Gift
Property in Exchange for Lifetime Care-Latent and Insidious Abuse of Older Persons, 12
PROB. L.J. 1, 16 (1994) (defining undue influence as "moral coercion, importunity which
cannot be resisted, or immoral solicitation causing one to do what is contrary to his or
her actual desires").
53 See Geriatrics Brief, supra note 16, at 23-24, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997)
(No. 95-1858) (addressing issue of undue influence in context of care and financial con-
siderations); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 64-65.
54 Geriatrics Brief, supra note 16, at 23-24, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No.
95-1858) (discussing problem of undue influence on patients seeking physician-assisted
suicide); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 64.
55 See Richard M. Doerflinger, Conclusion: Shaky Foundations and Slippery Slopes,
35 DUQ. L. REV. 523, 528 (1996) (noting that freedom to provide people with lethal drugs
is overly convenient solution for solving healthcare problems); Robert L. Kline, Give Me
Liberty and Give Me Death: Assisted Suicide as a Fundamental Liberty Interest, 6 B.U.
1997] 619
620 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:610
ciation also addressed this issue:56
Pressure to contain health care costs exacerbates the prob-
lem. Even if, as one would expect, health care insurers
would consciously seek to avoid suggesting to patients or
physicians that they consider financial costs in making a
decision to hasten death, the continuing pressure to reduce
costs can only constrain the availability and quality of pal-
hative care and support services that patients and families
need. These limitations on the availability of proper care
clearly can place pressure on patients to express a wish for
suicide that they might not otherwise feel. 57
Moreover, poor and minority individuals are at the greatest
risk of receiving inadequate care. 58 Thus, they feel the greatest
pressure to request physician-assisted suicide.
Medical fact number seven: Offering suicide reaffirms feelings
of worthlessness in patients.59 Here the American Geriatric So-
ciety argued as follows:
Many persons consider suicide or wish for early death while
they are angry or suffering. Since persons feeling worthless
often test others to see whether these views are shared, en-
countering agreement actually functions to affirm the deni-
gration of value [that person feels for his life].
To offer [physician-assisted suicide] at this time does not
merely offer an option but also affirms feelings of worthless-
PUB. INT. L.J. 527 (1997) (discussing Ninth Circuit's dismissal of argument that health-
care system will deny disadvantaged people adequate healthcare, but will fund programs
for them to commit suicide); Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 27, at 422 (taking de-
tailed look at healthcare payers' effect on use of physician-assisted suicide).
56 See AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 13-14, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) (addressing issue of healthcare costs in connection with physician-
assisted suicide); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 52-53.
57 AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 13-14, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) (discussing link between inadequate healthcare and pressure to seek
physician-assisted suicide); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 52.
58 AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 8, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)
(No. 96-110) (noting that centers serving predominantly minority patients are more
likely to have inadequate pain treatment available); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra
note 12, at 10.
59 See Tom L. Beauchamp, The Justification of Physician-Assisted Deaths, 29 IND. L.
REV. 1173, 1200 (1996) (discussing how pejorative connotations of suicide may limit pa-
tient's options and apply unnecessary pressure to seek suicide). See generally Smith, su-
pra note 3, at 380-81 (noting society's view that suicide is choice recognizing worthless-
ness of life); Mark Strasser, Assisted Suicide and the Competent Terminally Ill: On
Ordinary Treatments and Extraordinary Policies, 74 OR. L. REV. 539, 584 (1995)
(discussing possibility that patient's suicide may be classified as patient's only hope).
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ness or devaluation. Since, when comfortable and com-
forted, most patients feel that this was an unexpectedly im-
portant time, encouraging supportive care and discouraging
suicide seems well within the purview of wise public pol-
icy. 60
Medical fact number eight: Assisted suicide undermines the
trust patients have in healthcare providers.6 1 Here, an associa-
tion representing some one-thousand nursing homes gave their
opinion: 62
Many medical ethicists have written that introducing phy-
sician-assisted suicide into the physician-patient relation-
ship will seriously undermine patients' trust that physicians
are committed to preserving life, which is at the core of the
relationship. This breakdown of trust has even more drastic
effects on the relationship between [nursing homes] and the
people they serve. Unlike the selection of a doctor, the
choice to enter a nursing home or other facility for the aging
entails a fundamental life shift-uprooting one's home and
placing large areas of one's life into the hands of others.
Many seniors choose to make this move even when their
physical state does not make it necessary because they view
it as beneficial; they can trust in a facility's mission of pre-
serving life and health when they entrust their lives to it.
One of this nation's most vulnerable populations relies on
[nursing homes] to show a compassionate commitment to life
at one of its most trying yet precious moments. Especially if
residents feel that the choice will be subtly forced upon
them, physician-assisted suicide will threaten this relation-
60 Geriatrics Brief, supra note 16, at 8-9, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No.
95-1858) (addressing issue of reaffirming feelings of worthlessness in patients suffering
from illness who seek physician-assisted suicide); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra
note 12, at 17.
61 See generally Donald G. Casswell, Rejecting Criminal Liability for Life-Shortening
Palliative Care, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 127, 141 (1990) (discussing patient's
reliance upon medical practitioners in administration of palliative care); Martyn & Bour-
guignon, supra note 27, at 399-400 (discussing problems of implementing physician-
assisted suicide from medical prospective); Kenneth R. Thomas, Confronting End of Life
Decisions: Should We Expand the Right to Die?, 44-May FED. LAW. 30, 36 (1997)
(addressing problem that physician-assisted suicide could undermine any confidence pa-
tients might have in palliative care).
62 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Ass'n of Homes & Services for the Aging,
et al. in Support of the Petitioners at 1, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), available in 1996 WL
656324 (representing over five thousand non-profit facilities that provide housing and
healthcare to over one million aging and disabled); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra
note 12, at 67-68.
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ship and poison the environment in which long-term care
and services are provided.63
Medical fact number nine: Assisted suicide will replace pallia-
tive care for patients. 64 The American Medical Association ar-
gued that "the demand for physician-assisted suicide does not
come principally from those [patients who are in actual and un-
treatable] physical [pain at the very end of life]". 65 Rather, the
requests come from those patients who are healthy, chronically
ill, or terminally ill-and are depressed. 66 Those patients are
seeking relief from future pain, loss of dignity, or unduly burden-
ing their families. 67 Once physician-assisted suicide becomes
available, many patients, whose needs could have been met
through appropriate palliative care, will be directed instead to-
ward physician-assisted suicide. 68
Medical fact number ten: Holland's experience with assisted
suicide reveals the difficulty in complying with guidelines. 69 The
American Suicide Foundation examined a series of guidelines
63 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Ass'n of Homes & Services for the Aging,
et al. in Support of the Petitioners at 21, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110) (addressing issue that
physician-assisted suicide may ultimately undermine patients' confidence in physicians);
Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 67-68.
64 See generally James K. Rogers, Punishing Assisted Suicide: Where Legislators
Should Fear to Tread, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 647, 656-57 (1994) (addressing concern that
legalizing physician-assisted suicide will discourage proper counseling and palliative
care).
65 See AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 13-14, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) (discussing source of most requests for physician-assisted suicide);
Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 9.
66 See AlMA Brief, supra note 14, at 13-14, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) (addressing problem that many suicide requests come from depressed
individuals); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 11.
67 See AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 8, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 10-11.
68 See Hospice Brief, supra note 15, at 17, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997),
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), Coleson, Verba-
tim Arguments, supra note 12, at 15.
69 See L. Paul Hudgins, To Live or Die: Creating a Choice of Medically Assisted Sui-
cide in Michigan's Proposed Law, 8 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 609, 633-34 (1991) (setting forth
proposed guidelines for regulating assisted suicide in Michigan); Leon R. Kass & Nelson
Lund, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Medical Ethics and the Future of the Medical Profes-
sion, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 395, 412-13 (1996) (noting' that reports of euthanasia in Holland
show that there were 2,300 voluntary euthanasia cases, 400 cases of physician-assisted
suicide and over 1,000 cases of involuntary euthanasia in 1990 alone). But see Catherine
L. Bjorck, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Whose Life is it Anyway?, 47 SMU L. REV. 371,
395-96 (1994) (setting forth detailed guidelines in place in Holland regarding physician-
assisted suicide and arguing that this proves acceptance of physician-assisted suicide is
feasible).
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that currently exist in Holland for legal assistance in suicide. 70
These include, among others, that the request for euthanasia
must come from the patient, and must be entirely free and vol-
untary. 71 The patient must be experiencing intolerable suffering
and euthanasia must be a last resort.72
The American Suicide Foundation commented on the practice
of euthanasia in Holland as follows:
In practice, however, most of these guidelines are routinely
violated. As discussed previously, the principle of voluntari-
ness is compromised by the mental state that characterizes
these patients, and the undue influence of physicians and
family members. The criterion of "intolerable suffering" has
been stretched, with the approval of the Dutch Supreme
Court in the case of Dr. Chabot, to include cases where there
is absolutely no physical illness and where the mental suf-
fering itself might well have been treatable. The criterion of
terminal illness was abandoned by the Dutch on the ground
that cases of chronic illness could involve a situation of
"necessity" equal to those of terminal illness. In general, the
logic of permitting euthanasia in one set of circumstances
inevitably leads to acceptance of euthanasia in other circum-
stances where the "equities" appear to be similar.73
As the American Medical Association concluded about the
Holland experience, "[t]he study of euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide commissioned by the Dutch government showed
that approximately one in four cases of euthanasia did not qual-
ify as voluntary under the guidelines." 74
70 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Suicide Found. in Support of the Peti-
tioners at 17-18, 21-22, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110),
available in 1996 WL 665436 [hereinafter Suicide Briefl (setting forth series of criteria
fashioned through Dutch court decisions and guidelines by prosecutors of Royal Dutch
Medical Association); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 79-80.
71 See Suicide Brief, supra note 70, at 18, 21, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 (1997) (No. 96-110) (noting voluntary request means informed and without duress);
Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 80.
72 See Suicide Brief, supra note 70, at 21-22, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 (1997) (No. 96-110) (setting forth guidelines issued by Dutch minister for health);
Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 81-82.
73 Suicide Brief, supra note 70, at 22, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) (discussing problem of classifying patients as those suffering
"intolerable suffering") (quoting JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA, CLINICAL PRACTICE AND THE
LAW 210-16 (1994)); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 82.
74 AMA Brief, supra note 14, at 11, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)
(No. 96-110) (discussing difficulty in establishing adequate safeguards and procedures
related to physician-assisted suicide); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at
50-51.
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The American Suicide Foundation concluded its review of the
Holland experience:
The public has the illusion that legalizing assisted suicide
and euthanasia will give them greater autonomy. The
Dutch experience teaches us that legal sanction for assisted
suicide and euthanasia actually increases the power and
control of doctors who can suggest or encourage it, not pro-
pose obvious alternatives, ignore patients' ambivalence
about suicide, and even put to death patients who have not
requested it. 7 5
Finally, hospice care offers compassionate and appropriate al-
ternatives to suicide, 76 according to the brief of the National
Hospice Organization: 77
The decisions below failed to appreciate that the final stage
of life presents opportunities for meaningful experiences
that could be lost without the State's protection of life and
prevention of assisted suicide even among the terminally ill.
Moreover, many terminally-ill patients seek assistance with
suicide not because they cannot be cured, but rather because
they cannot bear the physical pain and depression that often
accompany terminal illness. These factors can almost always
be ameliorated. Hospice care provides a proven, effective al-
ternative to assisted suicide that is ideally suited to amelio-
rate the factors underlying the desire for suicide among the
terminally ill. By emphasizing palliative care, the hospice
movement has succeeded in increasing awareness in the
medical community of the need to treat pain and symptom
management aggressively. Furthermore, hospices under-
stand the psychological dimension of suffering and are
committed to treating the depression and fear that surround
75 Suicide Brief, supra note 70, at 30, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) (concluding that Dutch experience proves physician-assisted suicide
was not appropriate solution to end-of-life problems); Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, su-
pra note 12, at 87.
76 See generally Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 27, at 419-20 (addressing impact
of physician-assisted suicide on hospice care in United States); Donald E. Spencer, Prac-
tical Implications for Health Care Providers in a Physician-Assisted Suicide Environ-
ment, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 545, 547 (1995) (discussing hospice care as one alternative
to public's limited perception of choices); Wheeler, supra note 6, at 760 (noting that hos-
pice care prescribes medication to assuage pain and suffering, allowing "pain free"
death).
77 See Hospice Brief, supra note 15, at 4-5, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997),
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110) (arguing hospice
care provides proven, effective alternative to physician-assisted suicide); Coleson, Verba-
tim Arguments, supra note 12, at 14-15.
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terminal illness. When patients suffering from terminal ill-
ness are given proper palliative and supportive care, the de-
sire for assistance with suicide generally disappears. Hos-
pices provide substantial benefits to the patients' families as
well, by including them in the unit of care and by providing
them with the counseling, support, and anticipatory grief
work that has been proven so effective in softening the blow
of a loved one's death.78
Had the Court of Appeals understood that "[the] hospice way
of dying... offers a middle path between two undesirable
approaches in caring for the terminally-ill patient-curative,
high-technology medicine on one hand, and death by eutha-
nasia on the other hand," they never would have felt con-
strained by the false dichotomy represented by those two
options. Hospice offers patients and their families the op-
portunity to deal with the pain, depression, and other expe-
riences caused by dying and-unlike the alternative of phy-
sician-assisted suicide-[hospice] gives [patients] the
opportunity to continue to live. In light of the availability of
hospice care as a means to alleviate the physical and psycho-
logical suffering that underlies terminally-ill patients' desire
for assistance with suicide and the potential benefits to the
patients' families, the States of Washington and New York
were more than justified in concluding that their interest in
preserving life was just as strong during the last stage of life
as it was during all of life's other stages. 79
78 Hospice Brief, supra note 15, at 4-5, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110) (summarizing effec-
tive treatment hospice care provides as alternative to physician-assisted suicide); Cole-
son, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 14.
79 Hospice Brief, supra note 15, at 12-13, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997),
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110) (concluding that
Second and Ninth Circuits failed to fully appreciate value of hospice care in caring for
patients in end stages of life) (quoting Courtney S. Campbell et al., Conflicts of Con-
science: Hospice and Assisted Suicide, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June, 1995, at 36-37);
Coleson, Verbatim Arguments, supra note 12, at 14-15.
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